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Abstract
This paper serves to discuss religion and argues for the existence of the
supernatural/transcendental. The argument stems from an overwhelming amount of
evidence - in the form of religious practice and thought - from congeries of
communities and cultures, across a vast span of time (arguably all of human history),
the world over. Each community has grappled with the transcendental, something
beyond this world hic et nunc.
I will begin by defining religion - the lens through which we shall perceive who or
what we understand to be God, or the "spiritual". I will then explore various thoughts
that have been espoused at certain junctures in human history both in religion and
some of the philosophical thought that has commented on God and religion.
The Zulu Mvelinqangi; the Judeo-Christian God known by the ineffable
tetragrammaton [YHVH]; the Muslim Allah; the deities of the Egyptians, GrecoRomans, Hindus and Babylonians to name a few. Karen Armstrong (1999:116) – in
her A History of God – aptly points out that men have always speculated about an
Absolute. They play language-games and not one of their explanations suffices; the
study of religion, it can be argued, is as old as human thought (Jastrow 1901:1). In
fact religious thought and practices have been present in almost every human
culture (Murray & Rea 2008:x). Be it trees, animals, the sun or some transcendent
being, humans have pondered about the supernatural for millennia. This then begs
the question: “what is religion?”
A neat and compact denotation of the word religion is elusive; its object is vast and
greatly disparate, so much so that any concise definition would inadvertently exclude
a particular religion. To further compound this difficulty, specific religions (like the
cultures in which they are situated) are in continual flux. This is to say that any
definition proffered would possibly become obsolete at a later stage in human
history. A simple example would be if you succinctly defined religion as a belief in a

Higher Power, a Supreme Being. As a Christian it would be easy for me to fall into
what Clack & Cack (2008:1) call the “Parson Thwackum Error”, in defining religion by
means of my particular religion or one dominant in my culture. I would be confronted
with resistance from Buddhist scholars, a belief system that neither denies the
existence of deities nor subscribes to or believes in them.
The difficulty experienced in denoting the word religion has led to a congeries of
connotations cropping up, to the extent that Wilfred Cantwell Smith would rather
discard the term altogether. In his The Meaning and End of Religion, Smith
(1991:194) proposes this due to religion’s ambiguity and illegitimate traditional
meanings [connotations]. His allegations can easily be illustrated by the societal
reactions to the word religion: what comes to mind is the on-going crisis with ISIS
(Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), the 9/11 attacks or even the Colonisation of Africa
narrated vividly in the late Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart. Closer to home, one
may think of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa buttressing apartheid with
religion. A malpractice of religion, however, cannot justify throwing the baby out with
the bathwater. Let us explore the term religion and attempt to define it, with the
cognisance of the transience of any definition put forth.
Morris Jastrow (1901:1) said that in a sense, the study of religion
[Religionswissenschaft] is as old as human thought yet in another more apposite
sense, is the youngest of the sciences. Peter Harrison (1990:14) states that
Religionswissenschaft “defined its object and explicated it”; it was in accordance with
the development of the science that religion emerged as a natural object and one
that could be studied. Prior to that, religion was something people merely practised.
Armstrong (1999:112) articulates that it was simply a matter of “cult and ritual” as
opposed to ideas; it was not philosophical or theological. Religion was emotive and
not cognitive, something practised not pondered.
Justin L. Barrett makes this distinction clear in his essay: The Naturalness of
Religion and the Unnaturalness of Theology. As one can extrapolate from the title,
Barrett argues for the naturalness of religion. He describes religion as “a shared
body of ideas and practices related to the presumed existence of counterintuitive
intentional agents” (Barrett 2012:4). Barrett (2012:11) likens religion to language,
both being forms of cultural expression natural to human systems of cognition; he

cites the ease with which people engage in religious thought. People need little
instruction and religious beliefs are generally acquired so early in life that most
seldom remember not having them; archaeologically, evidence of ritual burial sites
imply that religion has been in our midst for north of thirty thousand years (Barrett
2012:11-12). We can summate that religion is natural and something people have
been engaged in for millennia, however, let us continue exploring the term in order to
explicate it further.
When we consult the literature in this discourse, we find a dichotomy of approaches
to the issue of defining religion: the substantive and the functional (Clack & Clack
2008:2; Thompson 2007:ix). The substantive definition defines religion according to
the “objects of faith” or “(theistic) belief content”; Melford E. Spiro states that religion
is “an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated
superhuman beings” (Clack & Clack 2008:2; Thompson 2007:ix). This definition is
compatible with the three great monotheistic faiths but runs into trouble when
confronted by Buddhism or certain sects of Jainism that do not believe in gods and
powerful spirits or supernatural entities like angels and jinn; such a narrow definition
would inadvertently exclude such belief systems (Clack & Clack 2008:2-3;
Thompson 2007:ix).
The functionalist approach in contrast, does not focus on belief content but rather the
role religion plays in a person’s life (Thompson 2007:ix). Clack & Clack (2008:3)
posit that the word religion is derived from the Latin religare meaning “to bind”. The
functionalist definition rings truer to the etymology of religion in that it investigates
how religion binds together members of a community into a coherent whole, the
values and morality that spring from it and how it contributes to their
Weltanschauungen (Clack & Clack 2008:3; Thompson 2007:ix). I would argue that
this is the sort of definition Karl Marx had in mind when he called religion the “opium
of the people”.
With the aid of Clack & Clack’s (2008:6) definition, I will now conflate the various
descriptions we have covered and proffer a denotation of religion as:
A cultural phenomenon, natural to humans, that is primarily practised by individuals
within a community. It consists of a shared set of concepts and creeds. It normally
presumes and lays claim to contact with supernatural entities or in the very least,

acknowledges transcendence. It provides a Weltanschauung to its adherents, and
offers a meaning to life along with goals to be attained. It can have either substantive
or functional qualities or both. It is generally but not prescriptively manifested in an
institutional form with organised rituals, a priesthood and areas or structures
dedicated to ceremonial activity.
Now that we have framed what religion is, we will use it as a lens through which we
will focus and also capture what it portrays to us. We will first explore a few instances
of religion. Through the ages, the idea of God has evolved and adapted to the needs
of those practising religion. God was initially viewed as a majestic yet distant Sky
God which begged the need for more relatable gods and spirits (Armstrong 1999:9);
this is instantiated by the veneration of ancestors practised in African traditional
religion, as well the anthropomorphic conceptions of Greek deities. Natural
phenomena necessitated some measure of understanding and these forces were
consequently personalised and made into gods as a means of explanation
(Armstrong 1999:11). This is seen with Thor being the reason behind thunder, Zeus
depicted as wielding lightning bolts, and the sun’s traverse across the sky
personified by a chariot driven by the Greek god Helios.
The sort of thought evinced here reminds me of izinganekwane [Zulu folklore] that
my grandmothers used to tell to me. One that springs to mind features a dog and a
cab driver. In short, the dog travelled with a cab driver and paid with a large
denomination banknote, thereafter asking for his change upon arriving at the
destination. The cab driver promptly sped off with the money and this story serves to
explain why dogs chase after cars. This may be a ludicrous example but in light of
these conceptions of God, we learn a lot more about ourselves and the thought we
evince, as well as our needs in a given moment. Whether we seek an explanation for
the world around us or the means to live in it – for instance, agrarian communities
were inclined to worship a female fertility goddess whereas warrior groups tended
towards a male god of war.
In antiquity, God was self-evident and pragmatic; people believed in Him because
He worked for them. God was not a theological or philosophical abstraction; people
did not sit in ivory towers cogitating proofs for His scientific and philosophical
soundness (Armstrong 1999:25). The way in which we approach God today is the

heritage of the Aufklärung – one that has overtones of positivism and C.S. Lewis’
“chronological snobbery”. Friedrich Nietzsche (1874:83) speaks of an age which
imagines that it “possesses the rarest of virtues, justice, to a greater degree than any
other age”, an age that boastfully insinuates progress. Jean-Paul Sartre (1946:306)
would be just as opposed to this – as Nietzsche was before him – stating that he, in
a sense, does not believe in progress because it implies amelioration. It is
chronological snobbery to assume that we are better off than any given society at
any point in history, when the Weltanschauungen and Zeitgeist were different to that
of ours. To look back from the imagined vantage point of a predominantly postAufklärung, Western mind-set and pass judgment on a different paradigm is
irresponsible and inconclusive. Who are we to say we are better off and what exactly
is the standard of measure? I would like to relate a story to stimulate thought on this
point.
The story begins with a United States government official enquiring about a Native
American chief’s observations of colonialists’ actions over a span of almost a century
– the wars, technological advances, the “progress” and the damage. To this, the
chief nodded in acknowledgment and the official continued to ask the chief’s opinion
on where the colonialists had gone wrong. The chief’s response related all the
positive aspects of their community – no taxes, no debt, an abundance of food, clean
water, free medical service – and almost derisively, he states that only the
colonialists were vacuous enough to presume they could improve such a system.
Any system, however, has its drawbacks and although there is truth in the chief’s
words, it is also true that there was a lot of infighting amongst the Native American
tribes; it becomes difficult to gauge “progress”.
It is easy to look back and label the civilisations observed as premodern, people who
were uncritical of their beliefs. To them, God was pragmatic and met immediate
needs, only later did man assume they could scrutinise Him under a microscope and
conceive definitions for an infinite God using their finite minds. The finitude of the
human mind led to a natural conclusion, that the idea of God contained in Western
thought would meet its demise. Before we explore this idea, let us focus in on some
instances of religion and the thought and practices thereof.

According to certain scholars and critics, the covenant made at Mount Sinai (circa
1200 BCE) between God and the Israelites only became important to them in the
seventh century BCE (Armstrong 1999:32). The covenant, scholars argue, paints a
picture of a polytheistic setting where Yahweh was preeminent; Israelites and much
of the Middle East were not yet monotheistic (Armstrong 1999:32). The problem for
me lies in the fact that the very Tanach that the scholars consult in making their
claims calls “other gods” demons (see Dt 32:17); nothing more than evil spirits,
shedim in Hebrew or daimonia in Greek. These beings are elevated to godhood
through idolatry and the Bible states that they are created beings worshipped as
gods that can do nothing (see Jr 10:3-5, 8-11; Rm 1:23; 1 Cor 8:4-5). The Israelites
and their contemporaries may have held to a limited polytheistic view but one should
question its validity.
Four centuries prior to the covenant at Mount Sinai, in the seventeenth century BCE,
Aryans (a people from what is now Iran) invaded, subdued and imposed their
religious ideas upon the natives of the Indus valley (Armstrong 1999:38). In the RigVeda (a collection of odes), we encounter a pantheon of gods that resemble those of
the Middle East. There are also traces of human thought that all these gods were
derived from one Absolute that transcended them all (Armstrong 1999:38). Unlike
some faith practices in antiquity (e.g. Babylonian and Egyptian), the Vedic religion
did not seek to explain the origins of life but consisted of a more existential
approach.
In the subsequent centuries following the Aryan invasion, the religious ideas of the
suppressed indigenous people resurfaced and an interest in karma resurged
(Armstrong 1999:39). In light of that, since one’s destiny was a direct result of their
actions, people were reluctant to blame gods for human behaviour and the
consequences thereof (Armstrong 1999:39). Vedic religion was preoccupied with
ritual sacrifice but the Indian practices of old renewed interest in yoga and the
external focus of the Vedic religion felt empty as people sought inner meaning; the
Indian practices were more internal and personal as opposed to the rigid Vedic
liturgy and rituals (Armstrong 1999:39).
In the wake of Hinduism and Buddhism, the gods lost status in India. Hindus and
Buddhists did not deny the existence of the gods but strove to conceive new means

to surpass and transcend them, to take charge of one’s own destiny (Armstrong
1999:39). Buddhists do not attribute religious experience to contact with a
supernatural being; they believe that it is natural to man (Armstrong 1999:9, 43).
Conversely, in Vedic religion people experienced a holy power (Brahman) through
sacrificial rituals. Brahman came to be understood as a power which sustains the
universe; some saw it as personal whilst others viewed it as an impersonal force.
Brahman is in fact neutral, permeates all life and cannot be addressed (Armstrong
1999:40).
Much like the people native to India had grown to be dissatisfied with the Vedic
religion, so too did the Greeks grow tired of the myths of religion used to explain
reality (Armstrong 1999:46). Richard Tarnas (1996:24) – in his The Passion of the
Western Mind – states that the Hellenic mind had moved in a general direction away
from “the supernatural and toward the natural”. The Greek civilisation is generally
agreed upon (case in point being Armstrong and Tarnas) as the birthplace of
Western philosophy with Plato (427-346 BCE) receiving primacy. In pagan antiquity,
it was believed that an archetypal world existed that corresponded to our own, a
notion that Plato translated into his conception of the world of the Forms or Ideas
(Armstrong 1999:43; Tarnas 1996:6). Since it was believed that nothing in this world
hic et nunc had any lasting significance and everything was in meaningless flux, then
a stable, universal, timeless and perfect world was superior to and stood beyond the
concrete world, forming it (Armstrong 1999:43; Tarnas 1996:6).
Aristotle (384-322 BCE) was heavily influenced by Plato but opposed his conception
of transcendent, pre-existent and self-subsistent Forms, opting rather to describe
them in a more immanent sense of being inherent in material objects (Armstrong
1999:49; Tarnas 1996:66). The only exception was Aristotle’s supreme Form
described as “an already existing actuality, absolute in its perfection, the only form
existing entirely separate from matter” – the Unmoved Mover, the “first cause of the
universe”, God (Armstrong 1999:50; Tarnas 1996:63). The ideas of Plato and
Aristotle would later serve to buttress the monotheists’ articulation of God although
Jewish and Muslim admirers would have to concede that these concepts were
“logical [necessities] rather that religious conviction[s]” and could have no impact on
the lives of ordinary mortals (Armstrong 1999:51; Tarnas 1996:63).This illustrates a
contrast between the Hellenic conception of wisdom and that of the Jews which

amounted to fearing God – according to the author of Ecclesiastes (or Wisdom of
Solomon) (Armstrong 1999:84). The question is, “how did Yahweh become the God
of Israel?”
Mark S. Smith states (1990:156) – in his The Early History of God – that although
cultural similarities between the Israelites and their Canaanite past as well as their
contemporaneous neighbours were identifiable, it is difficult to clarify the causes.
With that said, it is difficult to trace the development of Israelite monotheism back to
“the point of ancient Israel’s historical appearance [circa 1200 BCE]” (Smith
1990:156). The reasons may not be explicit but we can still follow the trend that
shows ancient Israel moving away from a (limited) polytheism similar to that of its
neighbours, to a religion that set them apart (Smith 1990:156). Armstrong (1999:68)
paints a picture of a struggle, or rather a battle, for the primacy of Yahweh in the
Middle East over against the pantheon of deities revered by a variety of nations. This
process of “differentiation” resulted in the “displacement of Baal from Israel’s national
cult” (Smith 1990:156). A notable example of the aforementioned process would be
Josiah’s reform circa 623 BCE (Carr 2010:133). David M. Carr describes (2010:267)
it as “a socio-religious reform that Josiah is said to have undertaken in the wake of
the decline of Assyrian influence over the area (2 Kings 23; compare 2 Chronicles
34), eliminating sanctuaries outside Jerusalem and laying claim to some of the
territories of the former northern kingdom”. This is one example of the move from
many gods to the one Judeo-Christian God, Yahweh, who revealed Himself to man
through Moses, the prophets and Jesus Christ.
This idea of revelation is expressed by Philo of Alexandria (25 BCE-50 CE), a
Hellenistic Jewish philosopher. Philo states that God reveals Himself to and
communicates with humanity using “powers” (Armstrong 1999:86). Two notable
powers which God uses are Kingly (intelligible order of the universe) and Creative
(blessing bestowed upon humanity) powers (Armstrong 1999:86). These powers are
knowable and make God knowable to us; they emanate from His unknowable
essential Being which Philo denotes as ousia (Armstrong 1999:86). According to
Philo, we will never know God as He is in Himself, “He utterly transcends the mind”;
we can only know God as He has chosen to reveal Himself to us (Armstrong
1999:85-86). Beyond revelation, we may find that we venture into the realm of what

Georg W.F. Hegel would term speculative [Spekulativ] philosophy (Inwood
1992:272).
My aim, then, is not to give a full account of God and all His characteristics. In actual
fact, this is an insuperable task given the fact that such a comprehensive explanation
is not even possible for our own terminable character. I daresay that we do not fully
understand ourselves so as to give an exhaustive reflexive description; to assume
our finitude can perceive the infinitude that is God, is folly. This, however, has not
stopped man from speculating, even about an Absolute and the explanations thereof
have never quite been adequate; there is a general consensus that human life
consists of some essential transcendent element (Armstrong 1999:51, 116).
What we see with religion and other human thought, is an attempt to articulate this
general and widespread human experience of an Absolute. The means of this
expression is language and consequently, it would be asinine not to afford – the
Swiss linguist and semiotician – Ferdinand de Saussure a seat at this round table.
De Saussure (1916:832) opposes the idea of language as merely a naming process
– words simply corresponding to the things they are naming. He finds that this
understanding presupposes that “ready-made ideas exist before words” and that the
“linking of a name and a thing is a very simple process” (Saussure 1916:832). De
Saussure (1916:832) then shows us that this approach can highlight something
about the dual nature of the linguistic sign. The linguistic sign [signe] is an “intimately
united” whole comprising of the signified [signifié] and the signifier [significant]; a
signe carries the concept of something along with its sensory representation (as
either sound or image which imply the concept as a whole) (Saussure 1916:833).
The significant is therefore not empty; there exists a “natural bond” between it and
the signifié (Saussure 1916:834). Humanity has articulated the transcendent and, in
so doing, has produced a signe. The words and imagery (significant) humans have
used and continue to use would be vacuous without a signifié. In fact, any discourse
about a transcendent world would be meaningless without the referent.
With the pronouncement of the death of God by Nietzcshe, however, we see an antifoundationalist removal of the signifié from thought, resulting in meaning being
simply perspectival. This is one aspect of a secular postmodern society, a
secularism that Armstrong (1999:4) describes as uncharted territory in Western

history. Some may perceive this as a positive pioneering endeavour and that
resorting to a transcendent signifié is a step backwards, however one cannot escape
reality; a reality that has been experienced by humanity for millennia. Consequently,
we see a return to spirituality in response to what Armstrong (1999:10) would call a
“God-shaped hole”.
Jeffery W. Robbins (ed. 2007:13, 15) speaks of a “transition from the death of God to
postmodern faith”; “from secularism to postsecularism”, and quoting John D. Caputo,
a move towards “religion without religion”. Celia Kourie (2006:75) illustrates this with
a prevalent interest in spirituality in society whether it is “the concept and practice [of]
Ubuntu”, utilisation of eastern meditation techniques and yoga. This can extend to
and be seen with regards to feng shui architecture and interior design, employing
acupuncture in medical practice and New Age spirituality espoused in popular
culture such as Rhonda Byrne’s The Secret.
My argument then, is to state that there exists a transcendence; one that I would
describe as God. I do not hold to the notion that all religions lead to God in the sense
of all roads leading to Rome. Alvin Plantinga’s use of the analogy of blind people
each touching a certain part of an elephant (be it the tail, trunk, tusks, etc.) better
describes my stance. No one person can claim a complete perception of the
elephant but each describes what they experience in an attempt to understand more
fully. The bottom line is that we are all experiencing the elephant, or rather, the
Absolute that it represents.
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